This course introduces the participant in the economic theory of political decision making (also known as ‘public choice’ or the positive theory of political decision making), which has been mentioned in several BA or MA courses in Public Administration. Important insights based on this approach include Downs’ theory on party competition, Niskanen’s insights on the behavior of bureaucrats, and Olson’s work on collective action problems. In this course, we further explore the applications of this approach to various problems and dilemma’s in political science and public administration. In addition, we also discuss game-theory and the spatial theory of voting as analytical tools often used to make public choice arguments.
Main goals of the 2010/11 course
This year the course aims to reach the following goals:
An understanding of the approach of analytical politics and public choice, including the main studies in the field;
An understanding of the main tools used in contemporary studies in analytical politics and public choice, especially tools from non cooperative game theory and spatial theory of preferences (‘spatial theory of voting’);
Understanding of a veto player, how this concept is used in contemporary studies, and what the limitations of this concept are.
Coordinator
Prof. dr. B. Steunenberg
Teaching format
Seminars
Course material
The course builds on the textbook of K.A Shepsle and M.S. Bonchek (1997) Analyzing politics: rationality, behavior, and institutions. New York: Norton, which has been used in the BA in Public Administration. In this course you will read a number of chapters from this book (of course, you are most welcome to read the other chapters as well) to provide the basics.
Other important publications using this perspective—and can be used as background reading or possible sources for additional consultation— include
D.C. Mueller (2003) Public Choice III, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press;
Enelow, James M. and Melvin J. Hinich (1984) The Spatial Theory of Voting: An Introduction, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hinich, Melvin J. and Michael C. Munger (1997) Analytical Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press;
P.J. Dunleavy (1991) Democracy, bureaucracy and public choice: economic explanations in political science, Hemel Hempstead: Harvester-Wheatsheaf,
M.J. Horn (1996) The political economy of public administration: institutional choice in the public sector, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
D.J. Kraan (1996) Budgetary decisions: a public choice approach, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Note that these titles are not necessarily obligatory readings for the course.
Besides this, several articles and book chapters, which will be published on the Blackboard site of the course.
Examination
Final paper
Required level
Please note that up to 20 students can participate in this elective and that MPhil-students have priority!
Schedule
Lectures: Wednesday 30/3 t/m 18/5
Time: 13-16 u in room 5B-02
This schedule is subject to change