Emotion is traditionally viewed as the enemy of cognition and rationality: one is supposed to suppress emotion in order to reason correctly. Is this view adequate? Recent research has shown that the contribution of emotion is crucial to taking sound decisions in practical situations. This holds especially in situations of ambiguity, incomplete information, and priority conflicts. In such circumstances, taking decisions on the basis of “gut feelings” or emotions is not a sign of irrationality, but often the only practical way to proceed. The new understanding of emotion has important implications for philosophical models of cognition, rationality, and especially science: emotion is revealed as playing an ineliminable role in scientific work. This course studies the new cognitivist view of emotion and its philosophical implications for our conception of rationality and knowledge.
Method of instruction
Seminar
Examination
Class presentations and final paper
Required reading
*Randolph R. Cornelius, The Science of Emotion: Research and Tradition in the Psychology of Emotion. Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1996. ISBN 0133001539 (pbk). *Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain. New York: Avon Books, 1995. ISBN 0380726475 (pbk). *Further specialized reading to be prescribed during the course.
Timetable
see Rooster BA3-programma 2008-2009
Registration
Please register for this course via U-twist. See registration procedure
Information
dr. J.W. McAllister ( j.w.mcallister@phil.leidenuniv.nl)
Remarks
Studiepad: Epistemologie en wetenschapsfilosofie